Sortals and the Subject-predicate Distinction (2001) by Michael Durrant Stephen Horton

Author:Michael Durrant, Stephen Horton [Michael Durrant, Stephen Horton]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780367249366
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2021-03-31T00:00:00+00:00

C. Some Elucidations and Expansions

Having thus set out what I claim to be the general consequences of failure to recognise the category of the sortal, and also the consequences of failure to recognise principles of counting and distinction formed from ‘matter’ terms equally as such principles in their own right, treating both as predicates, it is now time to elucidate and expand on: (i) what I have claimed is an impossible or no account of what constitutes an instance of a sortal; (ii) what I have claimed is an unintelligible account. Equally with regard to what constitutes an instance of a ‘matter’ term. I shall, in fact, not explicitly engage in the latter task but shall concentrate on the ‘sortal’ case as this is my principal interest; it will be clear to the reader what parallel arguments may be adduced in the latter type of case.

C.1. In that someone holds: (1) every particular name, singular symbol, is necessarily a name relating to a sortal (as in A.1. (1) above); or (2) every particular is necessarily a particular of a certain sort (as in A.2. (11) above), then he is committed to holding that what instances a sortal is a name specified by reference to that sortal itself; or again that what instances a sortal universal is a particular specified by reference to that sortal universal itself. Let me consider the ‘metaphysical’ formulation since the point I wish to make is easier to illustrate in this mode. What will instance the sortal universal cat is the particular cat; what will instance the sortal universal man is the particular man. Sortal universals are necessarily required to specify what instantiates them or may instantiate them. But just this is impossible. No universal may of necessity be required to specify its own instances since it is contingent what instantiates any universal i.e. what instantiates a universal is contingently an instance of that universal. The thesis that a universal, of necessity, is required to specify what may instance it yields the paradoxical result that all propositions expressing what Strawson calls the ‘instancing’ relation would be necessarily true. To refer to the earlier examples. What can instantiate the sortal universal cat is a particular cat - say Jemima. Since a particular cat is necessarily a cat, ‘Jemima is a cat’ becomes a necessarily true proposition. It is in that the thesis that what instances a sortal has a necessary reference to the sortal itself entails the above paradoxical result that I claim this thesis is impossible.

It may be counter claimed here that in that a sortal universal of necessity is used to specify its own instances the above paradoxical result follows, but that all one need hold is that the sortal universal is only mentioned in the specification of its own instances, in answering the question: ‘What constitutes an instance of a sortal?’. But in that case no specification of what constitutes an instance of a sortal is supplied; no answer to the question is provided.

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